Data validation and security for reprocessing. by Tolk, Keith Michael et al.
1075-PI (12-2005) Replaces (2-2005) Issue 
SANDIA REPORT 
SAND2008-6458 
Unlimited Release 
Printed October 2008  
 
 
 
Data Validation and Security for 
Reprocessing 
 
 
Benjamin B. Cipiti, Felicia A. Durán, Peter B. Merkle and Keith M. Tolk 
 
 
 
 
 
Prepared by 
Sandia National Laboratories 
Albuquerque, New Mexico  87185 and Livermore, California  94550 
 
Sandia is a multiprogram laboratory operated by Sandia Corporation, 
a Lockheed Martin Company, for the United States Department of Energy’s 
National Nuclear Security Administration under Contract DE-AC04-94AL85000. 
 
 
 
Approved for public release; further dissemination unlimited. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
Issued by Sandia National Laboratories, operated for the United States Department of Energy by 
Sandia Corporation. 
NOTICE:  This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the 
United States Government.  Neither the United States Government, nor any agency thereof, nor any 
of their employees, nor any of their contractors, subcontractors, or their employees, make any 
warranty, express or implied, or assume any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, 
completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or 
represent that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific 
commercial product, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, 
does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the 
United States Government, any agency thereof, or any of their contractors or subcontractors.  The 
views and opinions expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States 
Government, any agency thereof, or any of their contractors. 
 
Printed in the United States of America. This report has been reproduced directly from the best 
available copy. 
 
Available to DOE and DOE contractors from 
U.S. Department of Energy 
Office of Scientific and Technical Information 
P.O. Box 62 
Oak Ridge, TN  37831 
 
Telephone: (865)576-8401 
Facsimile: (865)576-5728 
E-Mail: reports@adonis.osti.gov 
Online ordering:  http://www.osti.gov/bridge  
 
 
 
Available to the public from 
U.S. Department of Commerce 
National Technical Information Service 
5285 Port Royal Rd 
Springfield, VA  22161 
 
Telephone: (800)553-6847 
Facsimile: (703)605-6900 
E-Mail: orders@ntis.fedworld.gov 
Online order:  http://www.ntis.gov/help/ordermethods.asp?loc=7-4-0#online  
 
 
 
3 
SAND2008-6458 
Unlimited Release 
Printed October 2008 
 
 
 
Data Validation and Security for Reprocessing 
 
Benjamin B. Cipiti, Advanced Nuclear Fuel Cycle Technology 
Felicia A. Durán, Security Systems Analysis 
Peter B. Merkle, Nuclear Material Monitoring & Advanced Technology 
Keith M. Tolk, Nuclear Material Monitoring & Advanced Technology 
Sandia National Laboratories 
P.O. Box 5800 
Albuquerque, NM  87185-0748 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Next generation nuclear fuel cycle facilities will face strict requirements on security and 
safeguards of nuclear material.  These requirements can result in expensive facilities.  The 
purpose of this project was to investigate how to incorporate safeguards and security into one 
plant monitoring system early in the design process to take better advantage of all plant process 
data, to improve confidence in the operation of the plant, and to optimize costs.  An existing 
reprocessing plant materials accountancy model was examined for use in evaluating integration 
of safeguards (both domestic and international) and security.  International safeguards require 
independent, secure, and authenticated measurements for materials accountability—it may be 
best to design stand-alone systems in addition to domestic safeguards instrumentation to 
minimize impact on operations.  In some cases, joint-use equipment may be appropriate.  
Existing domestic materials accountancy instrumentation can be used in conjunction with other 
monitoring equipment for plant security as well as through the use of material assurance 
indicators, a new metric for material control that is under development.  Future efforts will take 
the results of this work to demonstrate integration on the reprocessing plant model.   
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1.0 Introduction 
 
Current nuclear fuel reprocessing plants throughout the world have separate systems for 
managing materials accountability, international safeguards, and plant security.  Reprocessing 
plants are faced with the difficult challenge of accounting for and protecting nuclear material, 
and the requirements will probably only become more stringent with time.  One integrated plant 
monitoring system may not only be much more efficient, but may also improve the ability to 
safeguard next generation reprocessing plants. 
 
The purpose of this project was to investigate how to begin to incorporate materials 
accountability, international safeguards (data validation), and security into one integrated system 
early in the design process.  Much of the data used in these systems overlaps or could be better 
used if all areas had access to that data, so an integrated system could be much more efficient.  It 
would also open the door to taking advantage of new data sources to strengthen the security of 
the plant. 
 
The Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative (AFCI) is interested in building a new reprocessing 
capability in the United States.  However, it has been many years since a commercial-scale plant 
has been built in this country, and technology has improved significantly in that time.  It also 
makes sense to learn from past projects around the world to prevent future plants from becoming 
too expensive.   
 
Existing work in the AFCI program has developed a Safeguards Performance Model which has 
focused on designing the materials accountancy system for a reprocessing plant.  The model 
could be extended to incorporate data validation and security as well.  This paper provides a path 
forward on how to integrate these aspects into the model. 
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2.0 Safeguards Performance Model 
 
The Safeguards Performance Model is a transient materials tracking model of a UREX+1a 
reprocessing plant.  The Simulink toolbox, part of Matlab, has been used to develop a flow 
model.  This model tracks cold chemicals, bulk fluid flow, solids, and the individual elemental 
quantities of uranium, plutonium, neptunium, americium, curium, cesium, and strontium.  
Expected separation efficiencies are modeled to determine the quantity of nuclear material going 
into different streams.  Measurement models are used to simulate an expected measurement from 
a particular piece of instrumentation.  The model has been used for materials accountability 
analyses, but it can be extended to evaluate the integration of security and data authentication as 
well.  The following sections describe the mass balance, measurement models, and statistical 
analyses in more detail. 
 
2.1 Mass Balance 
 
The Simulink model is broken down into five different sub-models: front end, UREX extraction, 
CCD-PEG extraction, TRUEX extraction, and TALSPEAK extraction.  Dividing the plant up in 
this manner will be useful for potential changes to the separation steps in the future.  An entire 
plant simulation runs each model in sequence.  The model currently does not include product 
conversion at the end of each separation step, but this can be added later if appropriate.  The final 
product from each separation step (in dissolved fluid form) is used as the plant output. 
 
A complete mass balance was used as the basis of the model, so at any point in the model the 
total mass entering a component equals the total mass leaving a component unless the component 
volume or state is changing.  Cipiti et al. [1] provide more detailed information about the mass 
balance.  Every stream in the model contains information about the volume and mass flow rate, 
the concentration of the 7 key elements tracked, and the solids flow rate where appropriate (at 
the front end).  Separation efficiencies are used in the dissolver and the contactors to determine 
the percentage of each element going into a specific output stream.  Section 2.3 includes 
pertinent data about the flow rates and separation efficiencies.  
 
Tanks are modeled assuming a well-mixed volume.  In other words, it is assumed that if 
sampled, the tank will be at a perfectly mixed state based on the input and output streams.  The 
modeling of the contactor trains is less intuitive, but simplified since details about the individual 
contactors may not be known (from the materials accountability standpoint).  Each contactor 
train is broken up into three different model blocks to represent the extraction, strip, and scrub 
stages.  Each contactor block contains a volume equal to the number of stages within that block.  
Each block has two inputs and two outputs (organic and nitric acid), and the elemental content in 
the outputs is defined by a total separation efficiency. 
 
2.2 Measurement Models 
 
A universal measurement block has been designed for use in any location within the model.  This 
block can be used to simulate any type of desired measurement having to do with mass, volume, 
flow rate, or concentration.  The purpose of the block is to simulate measurements and then log 
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that measurement history as a variable in Matlab.  Once the measurements are collected, 
statistical tests can then be used to analyze the data.  Variations of these measurement blocks can 
be used for non-accountability measurements such as item accounting which will be important 
for international safeguards and security. 
 
Each measurement block contains parameters that are supplied by the user.  The user specifies 
which stream variable is going to be measured (such as the bulk fluid flow or an individual 
element’s concentration) and the sampling period of the measurement.  Finally, the random error, 
systematic error, drift, and calibration period can be defined for that particular measurement.  
The data from this measurement is recorded into a matrix with one value for each time period. 
 
2.3 UREX+1a Model 
 
This section provides a summary of the model for background to better visualize how the model 
can be extended to include data validation and security aspects.  The following five figures show 
the complete UREX+1a model in Simulink.  Plant equipment is labeled below the block, and 
each type of equipment shows the number of in-flows and out-flows.  The main dissolver 
solution output from each sub-model becomes the input for the next sub-model.  Measurement 
blocks are labeled by the measurement type below the block.  
 
The measurement blocks at first glance will appear to be excessive.  The measurements shown in 
Figures 1-5 are for an advanced plant that may be able to take advantage of technology advances 
to include more in-process measurements.  For a more conservative approach that only uses 
measurements that are available on plants today, much of this added measurement data can 
simply be ignored as if it did not exist.   
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Front End Model 
 
 
Measurement of a tank typically 
requires a level indicator and an 
analytical sample 
The dissolver, hulls wash, and 
centrifuge are modeled as one 
block—the % fuel entrained in 
the hulls can be changed 
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Figure 2: UREX Extraction 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
Figure 3: CCD-PEG Extraction 
 
 
 
 
 
Potential need for 
advanced NDA 
instrument for Pu 
Contactor trains were modeled as 
three blocks each with two inputs 
and two outputs—the separation 
efficiencies can be specified
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Figure 4: TRUEX Extraction 
 
 
Figure 5: TALSPEAK Extraction 
Diversion block pulls out 
specified components and 
can be placed anywhere 
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The Safeguards Performance Model already contains the process stream data, and measurement 
blocks simulate measurements of both process monitoring and materials accountancy 
information.  It will not be much of an extension to include additional measurements or 
monitoring points that are used for security or international safeguards. 
 
For example, item accounting and radiation monitors have not been included in the model yet, 
but these could be added.  This information will be useful for both materials accountability and 
plant security.  For international safeguards, authenticated measurements from independent 
instrumentation is required.  These additional measurement points can be added to the model to 
compare domestic accountability systems with the international accountability systems. 
 
The overall goal of this work is to design integrated data management and control systems to 
improve the effectiveness and lower the cost of safeguards and security of future plants.  This 
goal is long-term, and demonstration using a model will be accomplished in future work.  The 
next two sections describe the attributes of data authentication and security which will be used to 
help guide model development in the future. 
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3.0 International Safeguards 
 
The international expansion of nuclear power will lead to greater needs for new domestic and 
international safeguards systems.  Nuclear materials accounting activities within AFCI will be 
international in scope, and will likely involve safeguards partnerships of different types among 
the numerous countries.  In the context of these partnerships, safeguards protocols will be 
applied to international shipments of nuclear materials, as well as to associated reactors, nuclear 
material storage, and processing facility inventories.  The full scope of AFCI safeguards 
activities must be compatible with the specific requirements of each partner’s domestic nuclear 
materials control and accounting regime; at present, these are not uniform.  These future AFCI 
safeguards systems must also support any regional and international safeguards regimes under 
the purview of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that will pertain to AFCI 
transactions.  The support of the IAEA for nuclear cooperation is promising in this regard.   
Ideally, a new and unified system of nuclear material inventory tracking and control will be 
deployed throughout the AFCI partnership, satisfying at least the essential requirements of 
domestic, regional, and international safeguards protocols. 
 
In order to draw valid safeguards conclusions, a national or international safeguards authority 
must rely upon process and inventory data that are assured to be accurate and complete.  
Calculations of process mass balance and inventory are only as valid as the supporting data.  
Assurance of data validity may be provided by authentication measures integral to the safeguards 
equipment and their data records.  Some unavoidable disadvantages to the operator are presented 
by the necessity of data validation under external safeguards control.   In the case of IAEA 
monitoring, data authentication requires that inspectors have direct electronic and physical access 
to the safeguards equipment, during which time the operator’s access is severely limited.   
Operator support for IAEA personnel access, such as providing escort and logistical aid, can be 
intrusive and potentially disruptive to plant operations.   The operator has limited freedom to 
repair and maintain safeguards equipment in joint use with the IAEA due to authentication 
measures.  The cost and inconvenience of authentication grows as tamper indicating conduits and 
enclosures are required, due to burdens of installation, sealing, and inspection activities.  
However, the benefits to the AFCI operator of authentication measures will be substantial, 
especially when the advantages of remote and unattended safeguards monitoring systems are 
considered.   A full treatment of data authentication for safeguards monitoring is beyond the 
scope of this work; a comprehensive reference is available [2]. 
 
3.1 Data Authentication 
 
A key element of any nuclear material tracking and control system is its authentication 
capability.  Authentication is accomplished by measures that give the recipient of information or 
material the assurance that it is genuine, and has not been altered from its original state or 
replaced with a counterfeit.  The value of nuclear material diversion to an adversary drives their 
efforts to subvert safeguards monitoring and controls.  The IAEA assumes that the threat to their 
safeguards equipment in a facility is the facility operator acting with the support of the host 
nation.  This type of “insider” adversary is extremely formidable, driving the need for system 
authentication architectures that are verifiably robust against all forms of tampering and 
subversion.  The AFCI program has yet to define the level of adversary capability it will consider 
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for its safeguards design, but it can be assumed that comparable authentication measures will be 
necessary.   
 
An important aspect of authentication concerns the timing of implementation.  The best time to 
implement data authentication is in the design stage.  Practical experience with international 
safeguards has shown that it is practically impossible, or prohibitively expensive and disruptive 
to operations, to implement data authentication on systems that are already installed and in use.  
It may be more expensive to retrofit authentication than it would be to remove and replace the 
entire safeguards system entirely.  The AFCI safeguards design process should adopt a policy of 
“authentication by design” as a general policy.   
 
3.2 Data Authentication in Practice 
 
Successful design and installation of data authentication for international safeguards involves 
specific approval procedures.   Before any equipment can be authorized for safeguards use, the 
IAEA requires either a Vulnerability Review (VR) by IAEA experts or a Vulnerability 
Assessment (VA) of the design or actual system by an outside party.  In these vulnerability 
studies, the assumed adversary is the facility operator with the support of the host nation.  The 
formal vulnerability reviews are performed to identify security flaws before safeguards 
equipment is installed, to avoid costly retrofitting and facility disruption.   
 
A good authentication design will incorporate features to protect both equipment and data from 
tampering and subversion.  The IAEA’s fundamental authentication requirements address both 
hardware and software components; additional authentication measures may be needed in 
specific cases.   The most essential authentication measures are tamper protection and indication.  
All sensors, cables carrying raw data, and all other security critical components must be sealed 
inside a tamper indicating enclosure (TIE) or tamper indicating conduit.  Without such 
enclosures, the adversary can subtly alter hardware and software or undetectably extract and 
analyze safeguards information to achieve an undetected material diversion.  Cryptographic 
authentication must be applied on all data before transmittal outside a tamper indicating 
enclosure.  This prevents data substitution or analysis by the adversary. 
 
Note that data authentication benefits both the facility operator and the national party under 
safeguards, as well as the IAEA.  With robust authentication in place, the safeguards analysis of 
the IAEA can be based on high-confidence data records.  With an unauthenticated system, data 
errors or deliberate subversions by an unknown adversary may place a legitimate facility 
operation under needless suspicion of nuclear material diversion, with attendant costs and 
disruptions. 
 
3.3 Data Authentication Scenarios in Nuclear Reprocessing 
 
An authentication capability establishes objective measures of confidence that the hardware, 
software, and data components of a nuclear materials safeguards system have or have not been 
compromised or otherwise subverted by an adversary.  If successful in their attack on the 
safeguards system, the adversary would be able to divert nuclear material for illicit use.  To 
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illustrate the types of safeguards compromises that data authentication can deter and detect, 
consider the following examples from a hypothetical nuclear fuel reprocessing facility: 
 
• An automatic sampler collects a small liquid volume hourly from a bulk solution tank 
and places the sample in a shielded canister by a remote operator.  The canister is 
transported by pneumatic tube system to an analysis station several hundred meters 
away.  The adversary has designed an intercept in this tube system, a concealed 
location where an operator retrieves the canister and slightly dilutes the sample in a 
very brief time, returning the canister.  The data obtained from the sample analysis is 
rendered inaccurate.  This allows undetected diversions of small amounts of solution 
from the reprocessing area. 
 
• Data from flow meters are collected from a series of sensors throughout the 
reprocessing plant and stored on a central data server in spreadsheet files.  The plant 
operator uses these files for periodic internal material control and accounting.  The 
data files are transmitted to the national safeguards authority for their confirmatory 
analysis.  The adversary modifies certain values in the data files before transmittal, 
enabling the diversion of small quantities of nuclear material. 
 
In the first example, the lack of authentication measures on the canister being transported 
allowed ongoing and undetected nuclear material diversions.  The data values from the sample 
analysis were compromised by a physical interference in the process.  This example illustrates 
how physical authentication measures are integral to the authentication of data values.  In the 
second example, the lack of authentication measures (encryption) on the sensor data made it 
possible for the adversary to provide bogus data to the safeguards authority and carry out a 
nuclear material diversion successfully.   
 
The sample dilution attack can be defeated by a tamper-indicated enclosure and seal system.  
Before tube transport, the canister lid is secured with a tamper-indicating seal.  The body of the 
canister is tamper-indicating as well, and has a unique identifying mark to defeat counterfeit 
substitution.  For additional security, the pneumatic tube might be enclosed in a tamper-
indicating conduit.  Both the conduit and the canister bodies are subject to random inspections 
for integrity.  Before the sample is analyzed, the operator checks the seal integrity and the 
canister identity as verification.  With this system, any attempt to subvert a tube would be 
detected.  If the tube were subverted successfully, the seal or the canister would have to be 
defeated quickly and repaired to pass an integrity inspection.  The level of difficulty required to 
accomplish this attack serves to deter an adversary as well as provide a confident means of 
detecting any such attempts. 
 
The database attack can be defeated by data authentication measures for the process sensors.  
First, the sensor data processing takes place within a sealed tamper-indicating enclosure under 
control of the national authority.  An authentication signature is applied to the data, and it is 
strongly encrypted with the national authority’s public key before transmittal outside the 
enclosure.  This occurs on a regular and continuing basis.  The encrypted data records may be 
securely stored in the local facility before transmittal.  After the records are decrypted by the 
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national authority using their private key, the data records are provided to the facility to perform 
their analysis. 
 
The examples of material and data authentication measures provided are not a complete defense 
against all forms of subversion, but do illustrate the utility of authentication for safeguards. 
 
3.4 Authentication of Unattended and Remote Monitoring Systems  
 
Unattended and remote monitoring systems using authentication have many advantages.  They 
increase the efficiency of both the operator and the independent safeguards activity.  As facilities 
become larger and more highly automated, inspector entry into the facility becomes more 
difficult and more intrusive.  Escorting inspectors diverts facility personnel, and normal plant 
operations can be disrupted.  Installation of unattended or remote monitoring equipment lowers 
costs by reducing of the number of inspector facility visits to verify operations and collect data, 
also relieving the burden on traveling inspectors.  Joint use equipment using authentication 
reduces the complexity of the facility since less equipment is installed. 
 
Disadvantages of unattended and remote monitoring are the cost of authentication measures and 
ease of access by the facility operator.  Incorporating authentication components and supporting 
infrastructure in the equipment and facility design phase is most economical.  As previously 
noted, retrofitting existing equipment already installed, even if technically feasible, may be 
prohibitively expensive and interrupt operations.  In a typical authentication operation, after the 
safeguards authority performs authentication procedures on the equipment, it is placed under 
seal.  The operator is not permitted access to the equipment unless accompanied by an inspector.   
This constraint may complicate maintenance and repairs of failed equipment, but is unavoidable 
given the nature of the assumed threat to the safeguards system.  On the other hand, the facility 
operator is completely relieved of all safeguards equipment maintenance burdens. 
 
Inspector visits inside the facility are expensive for the operator.  Site personnel must leave their 
normal duties to serve as visit escorts, disrupting facility operations.  While the need for 
inspectors and technicians to access equipment for inspection, maintenance, and upgrades can 
never be completely eliminated, such visits can be minimized by implementing the following 
features for authentication: 
 
• Apply cryptographic data authentication as close to the sensor (data generator) as 
possible to minimize the need for tamper indicating enclosures. 
• Use active (real-time) intrusion detection measures instead of passive tamper 
detection, since passive tamper elements do not provide timely detections of 
tampering. 
• Use multiple layers of active tamper detection to increase confidence in the integrity 
of the system and thus data authenticity.   Physical inspection of passive tamper 
indicating features may not be necessary except for resolution of anomalies.   
• If the operator has agreed to give remote access to the equipment by virtual private 
network (VPN) technology, the inspector may be able to remotely maintain the 
equipment and install upgrades and patches without an inspector visit. 
• Design the equipment to minimize the need for inspections. 
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3.5 Joint Use Equipment and Authentication 
 
Process monitoring and safeguards monitoring equipment can be expensive to install and 
maintain.  For this reason, the joint use of specific equipment between multiple parties can be 
arranged.  In establishing a joint use system, all parties must be satisfied that the equipment is 
functioning properly and that the data is legitimate.  The benefits of Joint Use Equipment (JUE) 
systems are numerous.  Properly developed and deployed joint systems result in ease of data 
collection, reduction of support burdens, and reduced costs for the IAEA, the cognizant national 
safeguards authority, and the operator.  However, the potential disadvantages are significant.  
The independence, integrity, and authenticity of data from JUE must be achieved with a high 
degree of assurance in order to protect the interests of all parties, including proprietary 
commercial information.  The implementation in practice of joint use systems for international 
safeguards is subject to IAEA policies and the associated technical requirements.  These 
considerations govern the negotiation of a formal Joint Use Arrangement (JUA) implementing 
the equipment and data sharing arrangements between the IAEA and the external party. 
 
The complete data record from a defined time interval is typically not immediately available to 
the operator to support inventory analysis.  At least some data may not be shared until after an 
operator’s inventory declaration has been received by a safeguards authority, since an 
independent conclusion must be determined.   In the case of IAEA safeguards, any upgrades and 
software changes to the equipment will require advance approval, and these will likely be carried 
out by IAEA personnel.  Depending on the scope and complexity of the modifications, a new 
vulnerability analysis could be required to assure security concerns are evaluated and remediated 
as needed. 
 
3.5.1 Joint Use Data Authentication Example 
 
The following case study presents an example design for data validation in a safeguards 
instrument to be installed at a hypothetical AFCI facility.  For brevity, the details of secure 
communication of data files outside of the facility are not described. 
 
A new process train will be built at an existing plant.  The flow rate and conductivity of a 
continuously flowing solvent pipe will be measured for accurate safeguards monitoring.  Data 
values will be recorded every 1 second for safeguards analysis.  The instruments will be mounted 
in a remote area of the plant in an elevated radiation area.  Worker or safeguards inspector access 
to the area will not be routine, and will likely only occur during quarterly plant maintenance 
periods when the pipe is washed out for inventory measurements.  The IAEA and the national 
safeguards authority have agreed to the joint use of the data, which will be shared with the 
facility operator for their internal inventory control analysis. 
 
The flow and conductivity sensor elements are sited in a pipe access port, in contact with the 
process solution.  A data cable 10 meters long connects to the sensor electronics in a TIE.  The 
cable is enclosed in a metal tamper-indicating conduit, and welded to the pipe to cover the access 
port completely.  The TIE enclosure is secured with an active electronic seal unit.  No facility 
personnel can open the TIE without activating the seal alarm, which would record the event and 
securely transmit the alarm to the central facility safeguards monitoring control station.  Each 
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day, the safeguards data file is authenticated, encrypted, and stored for later communication to 
the IAEA central data collection computer in the facility. 
 
The security module in the TIE will store a unique public-private cryptographic sensor key pair.  
The sensor private key will be generated by the IAEA inspector when the system is activated and 
sealed.  This secure process within the protected security module creates a public-private 
asymmetric cryptographic sensor key pair.  The private half of the sensor key pair is stored 
within the security module.  This private key is never exported from the module and cannot be 
read from the module.  Module tampering will result in the zeroing of the private key and all 
stored data.  Also within the protected module is a monotonically increasing counter, or timer, 
which is running continually and cannot be altered (except that it could be reset when the key is 
created).  The public half of the sensor key pair is exported from the module and given to the 
IAEA staff upon initiation, for transfer to the IAEA Certificate Authority, which creates and 
publishes a public key certificate. 
 
The safeguards data file is supplied to the protected security module, which uses the sensor 
private key and trusted time to create a digital signature which is appended to the safeguards data 
file.  After secure transmission to the IAEA, the digital signature block is verified using the 
sensor public key.    
 
3.6 Integration with Domestic Safeguards 
 
Given the constraints on the operator in using dual-use equipment, future plants may find it more 
desirable for ease of operation to maintain independent systems for safeguards.  As long as the 
independent systems are designed into the plant at an early stage, the cost can be minimized.  
However, the international instrumentation should be designed in such a way as to minimize 
impact on operations.  Plant operators will only need to be concerned with operation, 
maintenance, and reporting of their domestic equipment. 
 
Future changes to the Simulink model will design in independent instrumentation for 
international safeguards.  The measurements from the model can go to an independent mass 
balance and can be compared to the domestic system.  The model then can be used to evaluate 
diversion or misuse scenarios that could slip through one system or both.  In this fashion, the 
model can be used as a basis for designing in authentication early. 
 
Data authentication will provide an essential capability to the AFCI partnership.  The entire 
enterprise will benefit if data authentication is considered from the earliest stages of AFCI 
design.  The technical expertise and experience of the international safeguards community 
should prove invaluable to AFCI in establishing its data authentication systems. 
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4.0 Physical Security1 
 
Within the NRC body of regulations that apply to nuclear facilities, including fuel cycle 
facilities, domestic safeguards include physical security and material control and accountability 
(MC&A).  Physical security is implemented by a facility’s physical protection system (PPS).  
Physical protection is defined as the use of technical, administrative, and operational measures to 
prevent the theft of nuclear material for the purposes of producing nuclear weapons, producing 
nuclear devices for nuclear terrorism, or using a facility or transportation system for radiological 
sabotage.   
 
4.1 Regulatory Context  
 
NRC regulations for physical security and MC&A focus on protection against sabotage and theft 
or diversion of nuclear material by an insider and/or outside adversary.  The specific 
requirements are provided in 10 CFR 73, “Physical Protection of Plants and Materials,” and 10 
CFR 74, “Material Control and Accountability of Special Nuclear Material.”  Because AFCI 
facilities, including the advanced reprocessing facilities, may be included on the list of U.S. 
facilities for inspection by the IAEA, NRC requirements under 10 CFR 75, “Safeguards on 
Nuclear Material – Implementation of US/IAEA Agreement,” may also need to be considered.  
The focus of international safeguards is protection against material diversion for the manufacture 
of nuclear weapons by the host state. 
 
Within its regulations, NRC has performance-based requirements to establish a design basis 
threat (DBT) that is based on the potential consequences of a variety of adversary attacks on their 
respective operations.  Physical protection and MC&A include performance-based requirements, 
as well as other very specific security measures that must be implemented by licensees.  The 
threats from, vulnerabilities to, and consequences of adversarial acts upon a nuclear facility must 
be determined and evaluated, and mitigating measures must be applied to establish appropriate 
levels of protection.  Vital area analysis is an approach that defines critical areas of a facility that 
must be protected.  A vulnerability assessment (VA) is a systems analysis methodology that 
evaluates the effectiveness of a site’s safeguards and security (S&S) protection systems against a 
range of potential threats that include sabotage, theft, or diversion of nuclear material.  A VA is 
conducted to provide a risk-based determination of the appropriate level of protection.  The 
potential consequences of a successful adversary attack determine the level of protection that an 
S&S system is required to provide.     
 
One of the most recent developments for reactor S&S by the NRC is the security assessment 
technology manual that provides high-level guidance for new nuclear reactors license 
applications [3, 4].  The NRC has adopted and adapted the Design Evaluation Process Outline 
(DEPO) systems analysis methodology that has been applied extensively for the VA of the PPS 
[5, 6, 7, 8].  The manual updates and revises a previous version of the report to provide 
conceptual and specific technical guidance for new nuclear power plant license applicants as 
                                                 
1  This discussion includes excerpts from Section 5.2.4 of Durán, et al., “Consolidate Fuel Treatment Center 
Regulatory Assessment, Rev. 0,” GNEP-CFTC-SAFH-MI-DV-2008-000287, U.S. Department of Energy 
(2008)  
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they develop a layout of a facility to enhance protection against sabotage and facilitate the use of 
physical security features, design the PPS, and analyze the effectiveness of the PPS against the 
DBT.  It is expected that a similar guidance would be developed and required by the NRC for 
fuel cycle facilities as well.  Modeling and analysis tools currently available and under 
development for licensee use are also described in the technology assessment manual.  
 
4.2 Design and Evaluation of Physical Protection Systems  
 
The PPS is an integral part of any nuclear facility.  A PPS should be designed to provide 
sufficient deterrence, detection, delay, response, and mitigation of the DBT to provide assurance 
of sufficient nuclear material protection, and prevention the theft, diversion, and/or radiological 
sabotage of nuclear material.  In “balanced” S&S systems, physical protection elements are 
integrated with nuclear MC&A programs and systems to ensure that accountable nuclear 
materials do not bypass the MC&A systems.  
 
The VA systems analysis methodology evaluates the effectiveness of a site’s protection systems 
to calculate a probability of system effectiveness (PE) for the PPS.   PE is a measure of the degree 
to which the system can protect targets against a range of potential threats.  Several modeling 
and analysis tools are available to support VAs (e.g., path evaluation using Analytic System and 
Software for Evaluating Safeguards and Security (ASSESS) [9] and Advanced Time Line 
Analysis System (ATLAS) [10], and response force evaluation using Joint Conflict and Tactical 
Simulation (JCATS) [11], table top exercises, and field exercises (force-on-force exercises)). 
 
Depending upon threat motivations and capabilities, a facility’s protection strategy can vary from 
“denial of access,” “denial of task,” or “containment.”   The overall S&S system of a facility is 
designed to protect against the DBT by integrating physical security and MC&A systems and 
practices.  A graded and layered approach and defense-in-depth philosophy for the design of the 
PPS, supported by the appropriate cost/benefit analyses, can help ensure that a desired protection 
level is achieved.  This approach provides multiple layers of protection in order to achieve an 
adequate level of facility/material target protection. 
 
4.3 New Facilities Design 
 
For the construction of new facilities, early consideration and inclusion of S&S programs in the 
conceptual/preliminary design phases of the project improve the overall effectiveness of the PPS, 
and ultimately reduce the costs associated with design, installation, and sustained operation of 
the PPS2.  New facility designs should incorporate proven, standardized S&S equipment and 
                                                 
2  The objective is to minimize overall lifecycle costs of the PPS, NOT initial PPS capital costs. Initial costs may 
be higher for the “optimum” S&S system than for other options, but the overwhelming majority of lifecycle 
costs are typically encountered in recurring, variable labor and retro-fit cost incurred once in operation, rather 
than in the fixed capital expenditures that are incurred early in the design, construction, and start-up phases. 
 Also, from a capital-cost only perspective, establishing the correct, performance-based PPS at the outset is 
generally less costly in the long term than designing and installing a minimal, yet compliant, PPS initially, and 
then adding Security features later when more sensitive operations are planned. Such an approach (adding 
Security to a completed facility) is generally the worst of all worlds, typically involving high capital asset 
acquisition expenditures, AND high recurring premium labor costs (for off hours, higher skill, accelerated 
schedule, etc.), as well as potentially reducing overall PPS effectiveness. 
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systems where possible, as well as adopt emerging S&S technologies (when they have been 
demonstrated to meet the requisite standards), without compromising design flexibility or 
adherence to overall system effectiveness requirements.  This approach provides a mechanism 
for the establishment of the PPS from the onset of the project, as well as ensuring timely and 
cost-effective procurement, installation, operation, and testing of identified security features.  
Additionally, this approach provides a means to integrate physical security and material control 
equipment, capabilities and strategies. 
 
The commercial-level throughput processes envisioned for GNEP fuel-cycle facilities will 
require innovation to meet production goals while ensuring adherence to future S&S 
performance standards.  While GNEP facilities will be designed, constructed, and operated in 
accordance with NRC regulations, due consideration should be given to some of the lessons 
learned in similar U.S. DOE programs.  U.S. DOE sites use a variety of VA applications, 
processes, and methodologies to determine the optimum PPS design for a given facility.  
Inclusion of the VA process in the early stages of nuclear facility concepts and designs is an 
integral part of emerging S&S project management practices.  DOE S&S programs provide 
lessons learned for application of best practices, where appropriate, for GNEP facility designers. 
 
The goal of these efforts is the development and implementation of a framework, methods, and 
tools that can be applied for modeling and evaluating integrated systems from the beginning of 
facility design and throughout facility operation.  A few recent examples are discussed in the 
following sections. 
 
4.3.1 Pit Disposition and Conversion Facility (PDCF) 
 
The Pit Disposition and Conversion Facility (PDCF) is a premier example of the concept of 
accounting for S&S features in the early design phases by performing Preliminary and 
Conceptual VAs, and using simulations and modeling to refine the final facility design to protect 
against the DOE DBT.  The PDCF design was developed in an iterative process, involving 
intense collaboration between S&S Analysts, site operations personnel, and Design Engineers.  
The designers and the Savannah River Site (SRS) VA team worked closely to ensure that 
accurate ASSESS models were developed, and that the results of numerous JCATS simulations, 
conducted on “notional” facility designs, were used to refine the facility’s PPS into the most final 
design. 
 
The SRS VA team used the results of the ASSESS and JCATS “runs” to determine a number of 
increasingly effective design enhancements, and refine the PPS and facility structural design into 
the most effective PPS configuration.  It was the first time the JCATS system was used in this a 
manner.  It allowed the designers to modify the design, based on the simulations derived, and re-
simulate the adversary scenario until they had determined the design met the acceptable risk 
profile of the customer.  All of this was done on a facility that does not yet physically exist, yet 
an effective PPS has already been determined. 
 
In the event of an escalation of DBT capability or PPS technology enhancements, the system can 
be evaluated in near-real-time on a simulation to determine the impact of those changes.  This 
approach is not only system-effective it has been demonstrated to be cost-effective as well.  
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Another ancillary benefit discovered during this project is that while JCATS cannot be used to 
replace them, this approach is also safer than live Force-on-Force exercises.  It is also believed to 
be an effective training tool to hone the battle-management skills of protective force and 
response force leaders. 
 
4.3.2 Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF) 
 
The Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF) proved to be an ideal opportunity to apply 
the lessons learned in the design of PDCF to another (at the time “notional”) facility.  Similar 
iterative processes (slightly modified to reflect process improvements and site-and operation-
specific conditions) were employed in the design and validation of both the MFFF and the PPS 
designs.  The results were satisfactory, in that the MFFF is now in the early stages of 
construction at SRS.  It is believed by those who participated in the MFFF analyses and 
modeling that the application of the “Security by Design” approach was instrumental in the 
construction authorization for the MFFF by the NRC, and will be a major determining factor in 
final licensing once it is completed.  
 
4.3.3 Advanced Fuel Cycle Facility (AFCF) 
 
The AFCF is an AFCI project, and is still in early conceptual stages of design.  The AFCF design 
includes large shielded and remotely maintained areas to validate, demonstrate, and improve 
spent fuel treatment processes, fuel fabrication processes, and Safeguards monitoring.  These 
systems will be fully integrated and operated at “Engineering Scale,”  and will be designed, 
constructed and operated with emphasis on protection of public and worker safety and the 
environment.  In addition, the AFCF is also a technology demonstration facility. Thus, the PPS 
will be designed to show that applicable IAEA and NRC requirements can be met. 
 
The S&S system for AFCF is intended to be an example of “Safeguards and Security by 
Design.”  Its processes, operations, structures, and protection systems are intended to be 
designed and constructed in a manner that will provide inherently robust protection of special 
nuclear material and spent nuclear fuel.  The unique construction features, the distinctive, “self-
protecting” nature of the materials being produced in the facility, and the implementation of 
advanced S&S measures are designed to provide inherently high levels of proliferation 
resistance. The AFCF S&S function will meet all current DOE requirements for the production, 
storage, and transportation of Category I special nuclear material, in a manner sufficient to 
prevent the theft, unauthorized use, or radiological sabotage by an adversary force as defined in 
the current (2005) DOE DBT. 
 
As it progresses, the facility design will incorporate innovative, state-of-the-art protection system 
features to ensure adequate protection, mitigate the impact of future changes in the DBT, and 
minimize the number of protective force personnel required to achieve a level of protection that 
is acceptable to the DOE. Those facility design features will be modeled and tested in 
simulations. The DOE and NRC both have licenses for JCATS, and the DOE is currently 
evaluating another tactical simulation (automated Vulnerability Evaluation for Risks from 
Terrorism - AVERT, an emerging simulations technology) for eventual approval as a VA 
scenario validation tool. 
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The MC&A program will be based on two levels of requirements.  The first level will provide 
the current safeguards required for licensing, regulating, and/or monitoring the AFCF.  The 
second level will provide the capability to develop advanced safeguards for licensing, regulating, 
and/or monitoring future full-scale commercial nuclear reprocessing facilities.  The AFCF will 
comply with all DOE MC&A requirements.  It will also provide the capability to develop and 
demonstrate advanced compliance methods related to the NRC and IAEA requirements.  The 
above measures are principally directed at proliferation resistance at the sub-national level, by 
insider or sub-national adversary groups. 
 
The processes and facilities recommended in the AFCI were selected to enhance proliferation 
resistance at the national level, taking into consideration the future prospect of deployment of the 
facilities of the AFCI fuel cycle to additional national and international locations.  The principal 
safeguards against national proliferation are the measures applied by the IAEA.  The AFCF 
design has progressed towards making provisions to demonstrate measures that might be applied 
to facilitate implementation of international safeguards by the IAEA.  While the throughputs and 
inventories of the AFCF may not be significant related to the potential of production facilities 
anticipated in the future (and the national and international Safeguards measures that will 
therefore be required), innovative protective measures are being developed and incorporated in 
AFCF and future production facility designs.  A key component of international safeguards for 
large-scale production facilities involves measures to monitor the locations and movement of 
nuclear materials as they are transferred into and out of material balance areas.  These measures 
typically consist of surveillance cameras and gross radiation sensors.  Their success is tied to the 
effectiveness of facility features specifically designed to enhance their effectiveness. 
 
The AFCF design, while not specifically requiring these measures to meet the requirements for a 
facility of its size and throughput, is evolving to include provisions for demonstration of these 
measures. Recommendations for design of storage facilities and material transport provisions are 
being incorporated.  Another example of effective international safeguards is the timely analysis 
of samples of nuclear materials from within the operating facilities.  Timely results require 
enhancement of the independent analysis capability of the international organization on-site.  
The design of the AFCF has evolved to include these capabilities.  In addition, measures for 
verification of the integrity of samples as they are drawn from declared locations and delivered 
for independent analysis are also being considered for demonstration in the AFCF facility design. 
 
The S&S philosophy of PPS design is evolving to include demonstration of independent and 
authenticated measurements for verification of operator declarations by international 
organizations, and to consider reporting through the national system to the international 
regulatory body, the IAEA.  The program has illustrated the need for a comprehensive data 
collection and evaluation system to support material accountancy and reporting on a national 
level, similar to that required of future domestic commercial facilities. 
 
4.4 Integrating Safeguards and Security for Nuclear Facility Design 
 
The need for integration of S&S, as well as safety and operations is an issue that is being 
addressed in all of the current efforts for developing future nuclear facilities (Generation IV, 
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AFCI, IAEA).  In the past, individual assessments of these areas have been performed through 
the use of detailed analyses techniques that have not been integrated in the design, evaluation, 
and operation of a facility.  This has often led to inefficient and costly design and operational 
requirements.  The major benefit of integrating these areas is more cost-effective and efficient 
design and operation of nuclear facilities.  Effective integration of these areas, however, will 
require the development and implementation of validated systems analysis and risk-based tools 
for modeling and evaluating integrated facility design and operation. 
 
One approach for addressing integration issues is to look at extending established methods and 
tools.  Several evolutionary activities are extending the established DEPO methodology and tools 
and look to provide different types of integration.  The DEPO methodology is a conditional risk 
approach based on the occurrence of an adversary attack.  Wyss et al. [12] developed a risk-
based approach for safeguards and security decision-making that provides additional data to 
consider adversary activities before an attack.  Several other efforts address integration of 
adversary activities to determine a wider range of threats beyond a design basis [13, 14, 15]; to 
develop an uncertainty risk analysis (URA) [16, 17, 18, 19] technique to evaluate the risks of 
intentional acts; and to provide total risk assessment capability (TRAC) that addresses adversary 
threat, vulnerability and consequence [20]. 
 
Dawson and Hester [21] developed a real-time effectiveness metric to aid in protecting nuclear 
materials against theft and sabotage.   The material assurance indicator (MAI) considers what 
materials are being protected, where they are in the facility, and when the material was last 
handled or monitored.  The MAI is designed to provide a quantitative metric of MC&A system 
effectiveness and to integrate with already-established methods for computing the effectiveness 
of facility protection systems to create a more complete picture of materials protection system 
performance.  As an additional demonstration of this integration approach, the MAI will be 
exercised with the AFCI Safeguards Performance Model [22] and is related to an overall effort to 
develop advanced process data acquisition, authentication, and management for civilian nuclear 
facilities [23].  In related work, Durán, Dawson, and Wyss [24, 25, 26] have been applying 
reactor risk methods, including human reliability analysis, and object-based event sequence trees 
[27] to develop a probabilistic analysis approach to integrate the MC&A protections and 
operational activities in a VA analysis.  These efforts focus on integrating MC&A protections, as 
well as other operational and process information to provide a measure of effectiveness for this 
level of system integration.   
 
Darby et al., [28] have also worked on the development of a risk analysis methodology for the 
analysis of integrated cyber and physical security elements within critical infrastructures.  The 
methodology applies evidenced-based uncertainty analysis techniques with attack graphs to 
evaluate “blended” security systems to determine the likelihood that a threat defeats a cyber or 
PPS.  In a similar effort to address the insider threat, system dynamics modeling is being applied 
to model the employee life-cycle and employee interactions with physical, cyber, and operational 
security system elements and to investigate the development of intrinsic security [29]. 
 
As the focus of U.S. nuclear technology development has moved to the international arena, 
IAEA security and safeguards requirements for non-proliferation are more of a consideration for 
domestic facilities.  The Generation IV (Gen IV) International Forum has had a working group 
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that has developed the Proliferation Risk and Physical Protection (PRPP) Methodology [30], a 
risk-based evaluation method that integrates proliferation resistance and physical protection.  The 
PRPP has been in development for more than five years and has been endorsed by the body of 
Gen IV countries.  The Gen IV PRPP working group has exercised the methodology for a 
sabotage scenario and is also looking at a material theft for proliferation scenario.  More 
recently, the Gen IV Safety Working Group and PRPP working groups have been addressing 
safety and security integration [31].  
 
Another effort in looking at international safeguards is the demonstration of advanced 
transparency at the Monju reactor [32, 33, 34, 35].  This work includes the development of a 
probability model for the calculation of diversion risk and advanced transparency [35], 
integration of safeguards, security, operations, and safety (SSOS) [34], utilization of system-
generated data for advanced transparency [33], and calculation of expected and observed risks in 
an advanced transparency framework [32]. 
 
The Safeguards by Design activities by the DOE (NE and NA) are focusing near-term on 
addressing DOE requirements for integrating safeguards, physical security, and proliferation 
resistance to develop a fully integrated design process and achieve institutionalized safeguards 
by design.3   
 
Darby et al. [36] provide a framework for integrating the disciplines of safety, operations, 
safeguard and security in the design and operation of nuclear facilities.  This work references 
several of the approaches mentioned above, and provides a preliminary framework that begins at 
the facility design and extends to facility operation.  It systematically addresses commonalities 
and differences among the disciplines and develops strategies for harmonization among them. 
 
The methodologies and technologies described above have significant similarities and overlap in 
their efforts to address integration of safeguards and security, and in some cases, safety and 
operations.  It speaks to the need for coordination of these activities and the development of an 
overall approach for achieving integration in these areas.  The majority of these approaches are 
combining or extending existing methodologies, often in an ad hoc manner, to achieve some 
integration, the level of which, in some cases, is limited by the available analysis tools and 
techniques.  This speaks to the significant need for the development of advanced analysis 
techniques to provide modeling and assessment of integrated systems.  To support the design, 
licensing, and operation of future nuclear facilities, one key issue is to define the level of 
integration that is desired and to address the question of the extent of integration among 
safeguards, security, as well as safety and operations that is achievable.  Within this context, 
future efforts should look to coordinating and leveraging ongoing efforts, systematically 
addressing commonalities and differences, and developing strategies for an overall framework, 
then envisioning advanced analysis techniques for implementation.   
 
                                                 
3  T. Bjornard, “Fully-Integrated Design Process Institutionalizing Safeguards by Design,” presented at GNEP 
Safeguards Working Group, (December 5-6, 2007). 
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4.5 Extending System Effectiveness for Physical Protection and 
MC&A 
 
To determine the effectiveness of a PPS, path analysis is performed to evaluate adversary paths 
and the associated detection, delay and response timelines.  Path analysis determines a 
probabilistic quantitative measure of timely detection on an adversary path.  Adversaries who 
attempt theft or diversion of material represent formidable threats because they may be in a 
position to circumvent system elements and interact directly with target material without being 
detected.  The delay and detection timelines associated with the path of adversary through a PPS 
may not be as relevant because these adversaries can choose the most opportune times and 
optimum strategies.  One strategy for addressing this type of threat would be to optimize the 
control and accountability of materials, the MC&A component of the facilities S&S system.  The 
previous and ongoing work described in the following sections will be exercised within the 
Safeguards Performance Model to investigate the applicability of these methods to supporting 
advanced safeguards development. 
 
4.5.1 Material Assurance Indicator 
 
Dawson and Hester [21] developed the deterministic MAI algorithm as a real-time effectiveness 
approach for protecting nuclear materials.  Before this, no measures or standards for comparison 
were defined to determine whether a protection system provided effective control of nuclear 
materials, that is, the effectiveness of an MC&A system.  The development of MAIs can be 
viewed as an extension of VA methodology that provides a quantitative measure, albeit a 
deterministic one, of MC&A effectiveness.  Initial testing for scenarios at hypothetical facilities 
has demonstrated the algorithm is applicable for evaluating MC&A system capability to provide 
detection of theft or diversion of nuclear material.   
 
A perfect materials control system would ensure that all the attributes and each location of 
materials in a system are known all the time.  The MAI algorithm estimates real-time 
effectiveness for each item and indicates material assurance continuously.  MAI can also be 
calculated for groups of items within a single container or vault.  The two-part formulation 
accounts for the attributes, locations, and time interval of materials: 
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where, 
 
MAI = Material Assurance Indicator 
MCF = Material Characterization Factor 
HR = Handling 
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AR = Attribute Monitoring 
RR = Gamma/Neutron Monitoring 
LF = Latency Factor 
Δt = Critical time 
t = Time when the last handling/monitoring occurred, subtracted from Δt  
N= The number of items defined 
 
The algorithm currently provides a deterministic point estimate for each item or group, separate 
from the pathways analysis methods for determining system effectiveness.  This approach will be 
exercised within the safeguards performance model to determine its applicability for the bulk 
volume operations in a reprocessing facility. 
 
4.5.2 Extending System Effectiveness for a VA to Incorporate MC&A  
 
A PPS includes many different types of sensors for detection of unauthorized activities.  In the 
MAI work, Dawson and Hester [21] observed that, similar to other sensors that perform a 
detection function in a PPS, many MC&A activities could be considered a type of sensor system, 
with alarm and assessment capabilities necessary for detection.  Additionally, MC&A procedures 
and technologies, from monitoring to inventory measurements, as well as process control 
operations, include methods that provide information about the attributes and location of 
materials as well as defining possible adversary path elements for theft or diversion of material.   
 
Some system elements support both the PPS and MC&A protection systems (for example, 
automated surveillance and personnel access control), and some MC&A protections are already 
incorporated, although perhaps not explicitly identified as such, in the current VA methodology.  
Other MC&A elements, however, have been difficult to characterize in ways that are compatible 
with VA’s.  The development of the MAI was one step toward addressing this gap and providing 
a measure of MC&A system capability.  Additional development focuses on incorporating 
MC&A protection elements within the existing probabilistic VA methodology to estimate PE 
both physical protection and MC&A.   
 
The MAI algorithm was developed separate from the probabilistic VA methodology for PE 
calculations.  The VA PE calculations address the physical protection component of the security 
system that focuses on external threats while the MAI algorithm development focused on 
material control.  The work of Durán et al. [24] and Durán and Wyss [25, 26] has focused on 
developing a probabilistic analogue to MAI algorithm in order to enable VA analysts to 
explicitly incorporate MC&A protections into the PE calculations performed under the existing 
probabilistic VA methodology.  The goal of these efforts is to provide an integrated effectiveness 
measure of a protection system that addresses physical protection and MC&A.   
 
4.5.2.1 Object-Based Paradigm for Theft of Material 
 
Adversaries who attempt theft and diversion of material are formidable threats, especially if they 
have extensive knowledge of and access to target materials.  They can take advantage of 
opportunities that arise to circumvent system elements and to interact directly with target 
material without being detected.  The delay and detection timelines associated with the path of 
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adversary through a PPS may not be as relevant because these adversaries can choose the most 
opportune times and optimum strategies.  One strategy for addressing this type of threat would 
be to optimize the control and accountability of materials, and to more fully incorporate and 
account for MC&A elements in the VA of the PPS. 
 
MC&A activities, from monitoring to inventory measurements, provide information about target 
materials and define security elements useful against insider threats.  In a sense, MC&A 
protection elements are interwoven within each physical protection layer, and provide additional 
detection and delay opportunities within the S&S system.  Activities that discourage material 
theft provide many, often reoccurring opportunities to determine the status of critical items (for 
example, daily administrative checks).   
 
Considering these observations about MC&A protection elements, Durán and Wyss [25, 26] 
applied an object-oriented modeling approach [27] to develop an object-based state machine 
paradigm to characterize the material theft scenario.  The object-based state model is shown in 
Figures 6 and 7.  The “system” is characterized by two objects – a Material Theft object and a 
Facility Status object.  The Material Theft object describes the possible steps in a specific theft 
scenario.  The figures below illustrate the state transition diagrams for each object – the Material 
Theft object (6) and the Facility Status object (7) and their interrelation.  Each box in the 
diagrams is a “state” in which the object can be at a point in time.  The arcs between each state 
are events that can occur to move the object from one state to another.  This approach 
characterizes material theft as a “race” between the theft stages from internal to external physical 
protection layers and the MC&A system elements that detect material is not where it should be.  
The Facility Status object indicates how MC&A protection elements act as a “switch” that 
change the state of the facility from normal to heightened alert where the facility is searching for 
material that is discovered “missing.”  This characterization of material theft is similar to the 
characterization of the attack by an outside adversary as a race between the adversary and PPS 
facility response team after detection has occurred.  
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Figure 6: State Transition Diagram for Material Theft Object 
 
 
Detect
abnormal
situation
Situation is
resolved
Normal
Searching for
Missing Item
Facility Status
 
 
Figure 7: State Transition Diagram for Facility Status Object 
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4.5.2.2 Timing for Material Theft 
 
One of the challenges for evaluating the effectiveness of an S&S protection system against theft 
and diversion of material is that the detection and delay timelines determined for the outside 
adversary and the PPS are not as relevant because an insider adversary can choose the most 
opportune time to take advantage of system vulnerabilities.  Indeed, the various theft events may 
be separated by large gaps in time.  Characterizing the MC&A protection elements in a facility in 
terms of an object-based state machine provides a framework for defining timing distributions 
for insider theft stages and facility alerts triggered by MC&A activities that can be convolved to 
determine the probability of theft or detection happening first.  Probabilistic convolution is a 
method that has been used previously in nuclear power plant PRA [37] and security timeline 
analyses [38].   
 
As a material theft is initiated and proceeds through the physical security layers of a facility, we 
can define the following probabilistic time variables: 
 
TR1   - Time for adversary to successfully remove target material from Physical Security 
Layer 1.  Time interval begins when the adversary obtains the material and ends 
when adversary removes target from Physical Security Layer 1. 
TR2   - Time for adversary to successfully remove target material from Physical Security 
Layer 2. Time interval begins when TR1 ends and ends when adversary removes 
target from Physical Security Layer 2. 
TR3   - Time for adversary to successfully remove target material from Physical Security 
Layer 3. Time interval begins when TR2 ends and ends when adversary removes 
target from Physical Security Layer 3. 
TMC&AAlert - Time when MC&A activities may indicate that target material is missing.  Time 
interval begins when theft occurs and ends when MC&A alert occurs. 
 
Each of these times is represented as a probability distribution in order to represent the variation 
in both the time before a removal opportunity presents itself and the time to accomplish the 
removal task.  Time and associated probabilities [P(TR1), P(TR4), P(TR3)] depend on the defeat 
methods used in scenario (e.g., removal through SNM monitor after disabling monitor).  These 
data are often available in the existing VA methodology data base.  Distributions for a “Normal” 
facility state can be degraded if MC&A alert has occurred and the facility state is “Searching for 
Missing Material.”  Logically, if an MC&A alert has occurred, the facility has a higher 
probability of detecting and finding the material, and the adversary has a lower probability of 
successfully removing the material from a Physical Security Layer. 
 
For the last time variable, TMC&AAlert, this is the time when the Facility state transitions from 
“Normal” state to “Searching for Missing Material” state (Alert).  Times and associated 
probabilities [P(TAlert)] are dependent on specific MC&A activities included in scenarios.  
Distributions can be developed considering specific MC&A activities and associated operational 
considerations.  Human reliability analysis (HRA) methods for evaluating operator attention to 
unannuciated alarm signals during nuclear power plant operations [39] provide insights for 
developing these distributions.  These methods also show how the effectiveness of repeated 
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inspections decreases over time if an anomalous condition is not recognized the first time it 
occurs. 
 
MC&A activities contribute to the effectiveness of the facility protection system by providing 
alerts that material may be missing.  The effectiveness of MC&A activities can be determined by 
comparing the probability distributions for the time for MC&A alerts [TMC&AAlert ] with the 
probability distributions for the time for removal of material by the adversary [TR1, TR2, and TR3] 
using probabilistic convolution to determine the probability that detection occurs before the 
material is removed from the facility.  The set of possible scenarios to be evaluated can be 
deduced by analyzing the object model as an event tree. 
 
4.5.2.3 Convolution Integral 
 
As a general example considering removal of material, let TM and TR be random variables over 
time.  Let tM and tR be specific values of these random variables.  The range of TM and TR is 
[0, ∞].  
 
Let P(tM) denote the probability density function for TM and let P(tR) denote the probability 
density function for TR.  Let P(tM, tR) denote the joint probability density function for TM and TR.  
 
A random variable for time of possible “detection” is defined as TD = TM - TR and tD is a specific 
value of this random variable.  The probability density function for TD is: 
 
∫∞ −==
0
}|),({)( MDMRRMD dttttttPtP  (3) 
 
If TM and TR are independent, then P(tM, tR)= P(tM)· P(tR), and 
 
∫∞ −⋅=
0
)()()( MDMMD dtttPtPtP  (4) 
 
The range of TD is [-∞, ∞].  The probability that TD is less than zero is: 
 
∫∞=<
0
)()0( DDD dttPtP  (5) 
 
This is the probability that an MC&A alert occurs and the facility transitions from the “Normal” 
state to the “Searching for Missing Material” before the insider is successful in moving the 
material past that physical protection layer. 
 
4.6 Model Development and Analysis 
 
The methods discussed in Section 4.5 will be further developed to be integrated with the 
Safeguards Performance Model and data authentication activities for a hypothetical UREX+1a 
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reprocessing facility.  To implement these methods, a hypothetical facility and physical 
protection system design will be developed based on consideration of the existing safeguards 
performance model as well as data authentication operations.  This will allow these new 
techniques for evaluating the effectiveness of MC&A protection elements to be exercised, 
evaluated and further developed.   
 
The ATLAS and ASSESS software programs [10, 9], and VA tools, which comprise a 
systematic approach for evaluating safeguards and security effectiveness against theft or 
sabotage of nuclear material by different adversaries, will be used to develop the hypothetical 
facility model and adversary sequence diagram to do a preliminary theft analysis.  A set of 
preliminary material theft scenarios will be defined, for which MC&A activities will be 
identified as possible “sensors.”  The elements of the complete theft scenarios will be further 
evaluated with the application of additional probabilistic risk analysis methods.  Additionally, 
interfaces with process monitoring and measurement data from the safeguards performance 
model and the data authentication will be defined and integrated to demonstrate how this 
information can be used to develop and evaluate more effective safeguards systems and improve 
the overall S&S for a facility. 
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5.0 Conclusion & Future Work 
 
The integration of data authentication for international safeguards with domestic safeguards will 
ultimately require two separate MC&A systems.  In some cases, joint use equipment may be 
appropriate, but operational impacts will need to be considered.  The additional instrumentation 
required for international monitoring will add cost, but the costs can be minimized if these 
considerations are introduced early in the design process.  The design of the plant should allow 
for international inspections and maintenance of equipment to be as un-intrusive as possible on 
plant operations.  Data authentication and encryption technology can be optimized if these needs 
are assumed at the onset of plant design. 
 
The integration of plant security with safeguards will take advantage of much of the 
accountability data that it already required.  Process monitoring and material accountancy 
measurements can feed into the MAI for security analyses.  However, additional measures such 
will be incorporated as well.  Again, the integration of security with safeguards can save 
considerable costs if incorporated early in the design process. 
 
Future work on the Safeguards Performance Model will extend the front and back end to include 
additional measures.  One location in the plant model will be chosen to use as a demonstration of 
the integration of data authentication and security.  Additional instrumentation will be added to 
represent secure, independent measurements for international safeguards.  Instrumentation and 
controls will also be added as appropriate for completing an MAI evaluation for that portion of 
the plant.  This model can then serve as a template for future expansion for full plant integration. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
36 
6.0 References 
 
1. B.B.  Cipiti, P.E.  Rexroth, N.L.  Ricker, “Safeguards Performance Modeling of a 
UREX+1a Reprocessing Plant,” SAND2007-6586 (October, 2007). 
2. IAEA, “Security Architecture for Unattended and Remote Monitoring Systems,” 
International Atomic Energy Agency, Division of Safeguards, Department of Safeguards 
Technical Support, Vienna, Austria (2003). 
3. D.W. Whitehead, C.S. Potter, III, and S.L. O’Connor,  “Nuclear Power Plant Security 
Assessment Technical Manual,” SAND2007-5591, Sandia National Laboratories, 
Albuquerque, NM (2007). 
4. ISL, “Nuclear Power Plant Security Assessment Format and Content Guide,” Part 1 of 3, 
Information Systems Laboratories, Rockville, MD (2007). 
5. M.L. Garcia, “The Design and Evaluation of Physical Protection Systems,” Boston: 
Butterworth-Heinemann (2001). 
6. M.L. Garcia, “Vulnerability Assessment of Physical Protection Systems,” Boston:  
Elsevier Butterworth-Heinemann (2005). 
7. IAEA, “The Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and Nuclear Facilities,” IAEA-
INFCIRC/225/Rev. 4 (Corrected), International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, (1999). 
8. U.S. Army,  Physical Security, Report FM 3-19.30, U.S. Department of the Army (2001). 
9. ASSESS (Analytic System and Software for Evaluating Safeguards and Security), 
Version 2.56, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Copyright 1989-2003. 
10. ATLAS (Adversary Time-Line Analysis System) software, Version 4.2, Sandia National 
Laboratories, Copyright 2003-2006. 
11. W.D. Henry, B. A. Brady, V. Koonce, C.D. Velasquez, and L.J. Myers, “Sandia JCATS 
Operator Manual,” SAND2004-3463P, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM 
(July 2004).  
12. G.D. Wyss, J.L. Darby, P.G. Dawson, K.J. Page, and E.E. Ryder, “Risk-Based Decision 
Approaches for Safeguards and Security Management,” in TRANSACTIONS, Vol. 95, pp. 
84-85, American Nuclear Society, LaGrange, IL (2006). 
13. P.B. Merkle, “Advanced Container Security Device: Adversary Plausible Threat 
Envelope,” SAND2005-5505, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM (2005). 
14. P.B. Merkle, “CBRN Weapons and Container Shipping: Adversary Plausible Threat 
Envelope,” SAND2006-0899, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM (2006). 
15. P.B. Merkle, “Extended Defense Systems: I. Adversary-Defender Modeling Grammar for 
Vulnerability Analysis and Threat Assessment,” SAND2006-1484, Sandia National 
Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM (2006). 
16. J.L. Darby, “Evaluation of Risk from Acts of Terrorism: The Adversary/Defender Model 
Using Belief and Fuzzy Sets,” SAND2006-5777, Sandia National Laboratories, 
Albuquerque, NM (2007). 
17. J.L. Darby, “Evaluation of Risks from Acts of Terrorism Using Belief and Fuzzy Sets,” 
Journal of Nuclear Materials Management, Vol. XXXV, Number 2, p. 19, Instutite of 
Nuclear Materials Management, Deerfield, IL (2007). 
18. J.L. Darby, “Linguistic Belief:  A Java Application for Linguistic Evaluation Using 
Belief, Fuzzy Sets and Approximate Reasoning,” SAND 2007-1299, Sandia National 
Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM (2007). 
37 
19. J.L. Darby, “Linguistic Evaluation of Terrorist Scenarios:  Example Application,” 
SAND2007-1301, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM (2007). 
20. G.D. Wyss, D. Pless, R. Rhea, C.J. Silva, P. Kaplan, R. Aguilar, and S.E. Conrad, “Total 
Risk Assessment Methodology,” not yet published, Sandia National Laboratories (2008). 
21. P.G. Dawson and P. Hester, P., “Real-Time Effectiveness Approach to Protecting 
Nuclear Materials,” in Proceedings of the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management 
47th Annual Meeting, Institute of Nuclear Materials Management (2006). 
22. F.A. Durán and B.B. Cipiti, B.B.  “Material Assurance Indicator for Safeguards 
Performance Modeling,” submitted for The 8th International Conference on Facility 
Operations – Safeguards Interface, SAND2007-7804A, Sandia National Laboratories, 
Albuquerque, NM (2007). 
23. D.H. Saltiel, G.T. Baldwin, B.B. Cipiti, D.D. Glidewell, P.E. Rexroth, G.E. Rochau, T.A. 
and K.M. Tolk, “Advanced Process Data Acquisition, Authentication, and Management 
for Civilian Nuclear Facilities,” in Proceedings of Institute for Nuclear Materials 
Management 48th Annual Meeting, Institute of Nuclear Materials Management (2007). 
24. F.A. Durán, F.A., P.G. Dawson, and G.D. Wyss, “Probabilistic Basis and Assessment 
Methodology for Effectiveness of Protecting Nuclear Material,” in TRANSACTIONS, 
Vol. 95, pp. 80-81 American Nuclear Society, LaGrange, IL (2006). 
25. F.A. Durán and  G.D. Wyss, “Probabilistic Basis and Assessment Methodology for 
Effectiveness of Protecting Nuclear Material,” in Proceedings of Institute for Nuclear 
Materials Management 48th Annual Meeting, Institute of Nuclear Materials Management 
(2007). 
26. F.A. Durán and G.D. Wyss, “Probabilistic Basis and Assessment Methodology for 
Effectiveness of Protecting Nuclear Material,” in Proceedings of Institute for Nuclear 
Materials Management 49th Annual Meeting, Institute of Nuclear Materials Management 
(2008). 
27. G.D. Wyss and F.A. Durán, “OBEST:  The Object-Based Event Scenario Tree 
Methodology,” SAND2001-0828, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM 
(March 2001). 
28. J.L. Darby, J. Phelan, G.B. Varnado, and G.D. Wyss, “A Cyber-Physical Security 
Assessment Methodology (CPSAM),” in TRANSACTIONS, Vol. xx, No.  pp. 82-83, 
American Nuclear Society, LaGrange, IL (2006). 
29. F.A. Durán, S.E. Conrad, G.N. Conrad, and P.L. Campbell, “Intrinsic Security for Insider 
Threats:  A Feasibility Study,” not yet published, Sandia National Laboratories (2008). 
30. PRPP, “Evaluation Methodology for Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection of 
Generation IV Nuclear Energy Systems,” Revision 5, Generation IV International Forum, 
GIV/PRPPWG/2006/005, <http://www.gen-4.org/Technology/horizontal/PRPPEM.pdf> 
(2006). 
31. R. Bari, P. Peterson, G-L. Fiorini, and T. Leahy, “Integration Efforts and Activities of the 
Risk and Safety Working Group and the Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection 
Experts Group,” Generation IV White Paper (2007). 
32. Cleary, V., Rochau, G., Vugrin, E., andYork, D., 2007.  “Calculating Expected and 
Observed Risks in an Advanced Transparency Framework,” in Proceedings of Institute 
for Nuclear Materials Management 48th Annual Meeting, Institute of Nuclear Materials 
Management (2007). 
38 
33. Mendez, C., Cleary, V., Rochau, G., Vugrin, E., and York, D., 2007.  “Utilizing System-
Generated Data for Advanced Transparency,” in Proceedings of Institute for Nuclear 
Materials Management 48th Annual Meeting, Institute of Nuclear Materials Management 
(2007).  
34. Rochau, G., Cleary, V., and York, D., 2007.  “Integration of Safeguards, Security, 
Operations, and Safety (SSOS),” in Proceedings of Institute for Nuclear Materials 
Management 48th Annual Meeting, Institute of Nuclear Materials Management (2007). 
35. Vurgin, E.D., White Vurgin, K.E., Cleary, V., Rochau, G., York, D., and Mendez, C.,   
“A Probability Model for the Calculation of Diversion Risk and Advanced 
Transparency,” in Proceedings of Institute for Nuclear Materials Management 48th 
Annual Meeting, Institute of Nuclear Materials Management (2007). 
36. Darby, J.L., Horak, K., LaChance, J.L., Tolk, K., and Whitehead, D., 2007.  “Framework 
for Integrating Safety Operations, Security, and Safeguards in the Design and Operation 
of Nuclear Facilities,” SAND 2007-6429, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, 
NM. 
37. “South Texas Project Probabilistic Safety Assessment,” PLG-0675, Houston Lighting 
and Power Company, Houston, TX (May 1989). 
38. H. A. Bennett, “The EASI Approach to Physical Security Evaluation,” SAND76-0500, 
Sandia National Laboratories, (1977). 
39. A.D. Swain III and H. E. Guttmann, “Handbook of Human Reliability Analysis with 
Emphasis on Nuclear Power Plants,” SAND80-0200, Sandia National Laboratories, 
1983.
39 
Distribution 
 
1 Mike Miller 
 P.O.  Box 1663 
 Los Alamos, NM  87545 
 
1 Frank Goldner 
 NE-54/Germantown Building 
 U.S. Department of Energy 
 1000 Independence Ave., S.W. 
 Washington, DC  20585-1290 
 
1 0736 John Kelly, 6770 
1 0747 Ken Sorenson, 6774 
2  0747 Ben Cipiti, 6774 
1 1202 Rebecca Horton, 5640 
1 0759 Betty Biringer, 6411 
1 0757 John L. Darby, 6414 
2 0757 Felicia A. Durán, 6414 
1 0757  John Russell, 6414 
1 0757 Consuelo Silva, 6414 
1 0757 Carla Ulibarrí, 6414 
1 0757 Gregory Wyss, 6414 
1 1374 Peter Merkle, 6723 
1 1371 Keith Tolk, 6720 
1 0899 Technical Library, 9536 (1 electronic copy) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
